Friedrich Nietzsche Good And Evil Pdf

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It was first published in In Beyond Good and Evil , Nietzsche accuses past philosophers of lacking critical sense and blindly accepting dogmatic premises in their consideration of morality. Specifically, he accuses them of founding grand metaphysical systems upon the faith that the good man is the opposite of the evil man, rather than just a different expression of the same basic impulses that find more direct expression in the evil man.

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He attended the famous Pforta School, then went to university at Bonn and at Leipzig, where he studied philology and read Schopenhauer. When he was only twenty-four he was appointed to the chair of classical philology at Basle University; he stayed there until his health forced him into retirement in While at Basle he made and broke his friendship with Wagner, participated as an ambulance orderly in the Franco-Prussian War, and published The Birth of Tragedy , Untimely Meditations —6 and the first part of Human, All Too Human ; two supplements entitled Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The Wanderer and his Shadow followed in and respectively.

Beyond Good and Evil

He attended the famous Pforta School, then went to university at Bonn and at Leipzig, where he studied philology and read Schopenhauer. When he was only twenty-four he was appointed to the chair of classical philology at Basle University; he stayed there until his health forced him into retirement in While at Basle he made and broke his friendship with Wagner, participated as an ambulance orderly in the Franco-Prussian War, and published The Birth of Tragedy , Untimely Meditations —6 and the first part of Human, All Too Human ; two supplements entitled Assorted Opinions and Maxims and The Wanderer and his Shadow followed in and respectively.

From until his final collapse in , except for brief interludes, he divorced himself from everyday life and, supported by his university pension, he lived mainly in France, Italy and Switzerland. The Dawn appeared in followed by The Gay Science in the autumn of Thus Spoke Zarathustra was written between and , and his last completed books were Ecce Homo, an autobiography, and Nietzsche contra Wagner.

He became insane in and remained in a condition of mental and physical paralysis until his death in He was the honorary president of the British Nietzsche Society. Hollingdale died in It is hard to imagine what Nietzsche's fate in the English-speaking world would have been without them. All of us in Nietzsche studies today are in Hollingdale's debt. He is equally interested in philosophy, music and literature, his particular areas being Friedrich Nietzsche and Richard Wagner.

It was the first book that Nietzsche wrote after what he considered to be his masterpiece, Thus Spoke Zarathustra. That had been for him a great creative effort, and he never wavered in his view that it contained all the most important things he had to say. Perhaps it was, none the less, a suspicion that he had not been so entirely successful in it as he had hoped that led him to claim that all the books he wrote subsequently, at least up to Twilight of the Idols , were commentaries on or expansions of it.

Nietzsche was always obsessed with there being a pattern to his life and works, and it is entirely characteristic of him that his last completed work, the wonderfully bizarre so-called autobiography Ecce Homo, should have been devoted to establishing what that pattern was, mainly through tracing the course of his literary productivity in the most tendentious way.

But since he was also obsessed with teasing his readers, I rather feel that, both in the letter to Burckhardt and in Ecce Homo, Nietzsche was poking fun, and am inclined to resist his claim about BGE. Looking away shall be my only negation. And all in all and on the whole: some day I wish only to be a Yes-sayer. It turned out to be, at least in his lifetime, for the latter only. Since it was clear that the world wasn't ready for Zarathustra's messages, ardently devoted to proclaiming how life was to be made worth living, Nietzsche turned more confidently than he had before, even in the great series of books which preceded Zarathustra, to diagnosing the reasons for the worthlessness of contemporary existence — both his and ours.

But its objects of attack are still wider than this suggests. For Nietzsche attacks modernity by analysing the perennial tendencies that it manifests. Such tragic heroism was short-lived, thanks to the arrival on the scene of Euripides and his philosophical counterpart Socrates. These two villains, according to Nietzsche, contrived the suicide of tragic drama through their purveying of optimistic rationalism: in teaching that virtue is knowledge, and that we therefore err through ignorance alone, they deprived their culture of its greatest insight, 8.

The situation went from bad to worse, in Nietzsche's view. For what in Socrates was merely a belief that reasoning could lead us to virtue-inducing wisdom became in the hands of his perversely brilliant pupil Plato a completely worked-out system, which, whatever its author may have thought about it and Plato was in many ways the most pessimistic of philosophers , was regarded by Nietzsche as the hideous perfection of optimism in its positing of a world more real than this one, a world immune to change, and thus to decay and death.

Furthermore, however decadent Socrates and his philosophical progeny may have been, they represent the decadence of something magnificent, and thus reflect, however distortedly, one of mankind's supreme moments. The relationship of the Jews to their god was not of a kind to induce in them a tragic vision of existence, but it was of a kind that Nietzsche could admire, and several passages in BGE celebrate it. But while he seems always to have felt that there was nothing inevitable in the movement of decline from the tragic Greeks to their successors in other words that with better luck the latter could have maintained, perhaps even have extended, the tragic insights of the former , it was inherent in Judaism that it should lead to its own overthrow in the most disastrous way.

Constantly on the look-out for a Messiah, the Jews finally got one; and though they denied that he was the genuine article, he acquired enough of a following to conquer the civilized world, at any rate the western part of it. Nietzsche's favourite activity — there can be no doubt about it — was celebration. But when he realized how little there was to celebrate in the world around him, and how much to be nauseated by, he brought a gusto to his demolitions that makes them marvellously exhilarating.

But in fact the prejudices of philosophers turn out to be ones that we all share. Or perhaps it is fairer to say that Nietzsche regards us all, insofar as we subscribe to a system of values, as being philosophers.

Nietzsche immediately raises a series of questions concerning values that we hold so deeply that we are not aware of having them as values at all.

He is, as so often, interested in asking a question prior to any it would normally occur to us to ask. We could hardly go out consciously looking for untruth. As it stands, this first question seems provokingly silly, and it is only when we realize that with it Nietzsche is launching on a series of questions that we are made to feel genuinely uneasy. To want truth and begin searching for it we need to have confidence in our capacity to find it; to recognize it when we encounter it.

What gives us this confidence? We operate, in the most natural way, with a series of opposites, of which truth—falsity is the most obvious and fundamental. Indeed, it is hard to see how we could avoid working in this way, and one might feel inclined to ask Nietzsche, before he succeeds in dazzling us with a series of increasingly alarming doubts, whether he doesn't operate within this dichotomy too.

And it very soon turns out that he does. The issues that he is most valuably concerned with in these heady opening sections are all closely related to the first one, but not identical with it.

His real anxieties have to do with our readiness to take as truths things that for him manifestly aren't, thereby displaying the lack of refinement in our sense of truth. In addition, he is irritated by the dogmatism that insists that between the poles of truth—falsity, good—bad, and so on, there can be no fruitful connections. And, perhaps crucially, he claims and here I quote the whole of Section 4 : The falseness of a judgement is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgement: it is here that our new language perhaps sounds strangest.

The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, lifepreserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding; and our fundamental tendency is to assert that the falsest judgements to which synthetic judgements a priori belong are the most indispensable to us, that without granting as true the fictions of logic, without measuring reality against the purely invented world of the unconditional and self-identical, without a continual falsification of the world by means of numbers, mankind could not live — that to renounce false judgements would be to renounce life, would be to deny life.

To recognize untruth as a condition of life: that, to be sure, means to resist customary value-sentiments in a dangerous fashion; and a philosophy which ventures to do so places itself, by that act alone, beyond good and evil.

This remarkable passage, besides being perplexing, may very well be true. To make it clearer it is necessary to run the risk that besets all commentators on Nietzsche — that of seeming to be painfully prosaic. However, to offer my interpretation: Nietzsche is not claiming that we do, or should, embrace judgements that we know to be false — it is not even clear that such a suggestion makes sense. His point is rather that many of the judgements to which we subscribe most firmly may in fact be false, but that it is better that we should not discover this, or that it may be better.

We should, that is, be very careful about where our philosophers are leading us. Actually he would have made his point more effectively if he had spoken of scientists rather than of philosophers, for the latter have not been notably successful in uncovering any concrete truths, palatable or the reverse, at any stage in the history of the subject.

But the search for truth at any cost, though it is inspired by a philosophy, has been carried through with terrifying success by scientists; admittedly more so in the century since Nietzsche wrote that passage than in all preceding times. But one can't decide to believe in something because it ministers to life, though one thinks that it is false, simply because one can't decide to believe. One should have more respect for the bashfulness with which nature has hidden behind riddles and iridescent uncertainties.

It must be the case that he was so concerned with the drive to truth, which philosophers ceaselessly boast of possessing to a supreme degree, that he overlooked what ought to have been for him their gratifying failure-rate.

Or, more sympathetically to him, one might say it was the whole nexus of scienceinspired-by-philosophy-inspired-by-religion that really concerned him. For, as he had argued in The Gay Science and was to argue again at greater length in The Genealogy of Morals, it was the self-destructive urge of Christianity, intent on exploring to its furthest recesses the glory of God's world, that led to the discovery that explanations of natural phenomena could continue indefinitely without ever needing to call on divine assistance.

So if there is one good thing about Christianity, mustn't this be its inherent tendency to autodestruct? This is where Nietzsche's passion for intellectual cleanliness asserts itself. For although we think of Christianity as primarily a religion, it is, like all systems of religious belief, based on a set of views about the way things are, in other words a metaphysic.

And as soon as he hears that word, Nietzsche pounces. He puts his case in Section 6, which begins: It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy has hitherto been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir; moreover, that the moral or immoral intentions in every philosophy have every time constituted the real germ of life out of which the entire plant has grown.

To explain how a philosopher's most remote metaphysical assertions have actually been arrived at, it is always well and wise to ask oneself first: what morality does this does he — aim at? So, in the course of four pages, Nietzsche has performed a volte face.

Having called into question the value of the urge to knowledge, he now denies that it ever is the basic urge, for we always pursue knowledge, so-called, in the interests of supporting a moral order, which is a dressed-up version of how we want things to be, or how we want them to be forced to be. He immediately goes on to instance Kant and Spinoza, who are certainly two flagrant examples of what he has just claimed.

The search for truth is a dubious enterprise, it seems, both because it isn't clear that it's a good idea for us to try to live with it, and because the very notion of finding truth is in itself suspect. But he has no sooner made these points than he arraigns philosophers for not really searching for truth, but for presenting as truth what they want to be the case!

Is he merely asking that they should be more honest with themselves and their public? Hardly, for he attacks them, so far as their conclusions go, for inventing worlds that put this one to shame. But why is that in itself wrong, if their inventions are magnificent when judged by, perhaps, aesthetic criteria or by the enrichment of life that they — the invented worlds — have There is no simple answer to that question, for the best of reasons.

Many of Nietzsche's commentators have taken him to task for what they see as crucial vacillations. Yet it is impossible for a person who feels these issues as deeply as he does not to be torn — Nietzsche's characteristic condition. He is far too honest to deny the enormous allure of what in the end seems to him harmful; so ruthless with himself, indeed, that he has constantly to fight off a kind of paralysis in the face of the huge diversity of phenomena that he feels forcing themselves on his attention.

In this they are deluded, however, and Nietzsche provides them with an object lesson in bringing the whole of one's personality into one's work, which he does so blatantly that no one could be under any false impressions about it. Thus we often find him praising lightheartedness: urging us not to burrow but to remain at the surfaces of things, practising a kind of ideal frivolity.

But no less often he exhorts us to stop at nothing in order to find out what is really the case, especially in that most treacherous area, the human heart. It is Nietzsche's ultimate task, throughout all his work, to justify that transition, to see that it is not a mere sleight of argument or act of self-betrayal. In the end, what he accuses philosophers of is cheapness and over-simplification.

O you noble Stoics, what fraudulent words! Think of a being such as nature is, prodigal beyond measure, indifferent beyond measure, without aims or intentions, without mercy or justice, at once fruitful and barren and uncertain; think of indifference itself as a power — how could you live according to such indifference? To live — is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature? Is living not valuating, preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different?

Nietzsche takes the Stoics to task because they provide a particularly clear example of the dishonesty and trickery that he finds pervasive in philosophy. Their avowed ideal of finding out what nature is and then submitting to it, with the idea of the nobility of such an enterprise being smuggled in along the way, is mere humbug.

In the first place, they tailor nature to suit their purposes, making it into a much less intimidating affair than it Secondly, since nature is simply everything that there is, the idea of submitting to it rather than fighting it turns out to be boastful nonsense, an empty flourish to keep up their spirits.

Nature is already in a state of ceaseless combat, one part against all others — this is an idea which Nietzsche first propounded in The Birth of Tragedy, and which he never abandoned, though he often modified his formulations of it. Indeed, anyone who knows any of Nietzsche's writings may find his attack on the Stoics odd.

And the fact that BGE, allegedly a work that says the same things as Zarathustra, contains not a single mention of the Superman, and only one of the eternal recurrence, might lead one to think that Nietzsche had changed his mind, as usual without announcing the fact. Yet that one reference to the eternal recurrence is a very emphatic one. It occurs in Section 56, where Nietzsche writes of the ideal of the most exuberant, most living and most world-affirming man, who has not only learned to get on and treat with all that was and is but who wants to have it again as it was and is to all eternity, insatiably calling out da capo not only to himself but to the whole piece and play, and not only to a play but fundamentally to him who needs precisely this play — and who makes it necessary.

Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil: A Morality of Immoralism

Search hundreds of books on our site. It takes up and expands on the ideas of his previous work, Thus Spoke Zarathustra , replacing that work's sunny and life-affirming character with a highly critical, polemical approach. In Beyond Good and Evil , Nietzsche attacks past philosophers for their alleged lack of critical sense and their blind acceptance of Christian premises in their consideration of morality. The work moves into the realm "beyond good and evil" in the sense of leaving behind the traditional morality which Nietzsche subjects to a destructive critique in favour of what he regards as an affirmative approach that fearlessly confronts the perspectival nature of knowledge and the perilous condition of the modern individual. Welcome to eBooks for All! On this site everything is free and legal. No registration required and no download limitations.

Start growing! Boost your life and career with the best book summaries. Fetch — if you have the guts! Friedrich Nietzsche was a German philosopher, poet, composer, classical philologist, and all-around cultural critic. He lived just five and a half decades: he spent the first two and a half as a brilliant student of classical languages, the next one as a professor, the fourth one as an iconoclastic philosopher, and the last one as a madman. Born on October 15, , Nietzsche began his career as a classical philologist and, at the age of 24, he became the youngest individual ever to hold the Chair of Classical Philology at the University of Basel the record stands to this day.

Beyond Good and Evil. Friedrich Nietzsche. This eBook was designed and published by Planet PDF. For more free. eBooks visit our Web site at.

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These books are published in Australia and are out of copyright here. Be sure to check the copyright laws for your country before downloading, reading or sharing them. Philosophers are accustomed to speak of the will as though it were the best-known thing in the world; indeed, Schopenhauer has given us to understand that the will alone is really known to us, absolutely and completely known, without deduction or addition. Beyond Good and Evil Friedrich Nietzsche,

Beyond Good and Evil confirmed Nietzsche's position as the towering European philosopher of his age. The work dramatically rejects the tradition of Western thought with its notions of truth and God, good and evil. Nietzsche demonstrates that the Christian world is steeped in a false piety and infected with a 'slave morality'. With wit and energy, he turns from this critique to a philosophy that celebrates the present and demands that the individual imposes their own 'will to power' upon the world. The Birth of Tragedy or Hellenism and

Beyond Good and Evil

А ждет его именно. Он скрыл информацию от директора, запустил вирус в самый защищенный компьютер страны, и, разумеется, ему придется за это дорого заплатить. Он исходил из самых патриотических соображений, но все пошло вкривь и вкось.

Коммандер был вынужден принимать невероятные решения, совершать чудовищные поступки, на которые, как ему казалось раньше, не был способен. Это единственное решение. Единственное, что остается.

Наверняка сегодня к ним поступил только один канадец со сломанным запястьем и сотрясением мозга, и его карточку нетрудно будет найти. Беккер понимал, что в больнице не захотят назвать имя и адрес больного незнакомому человеку, но он хорошо подготовился к разговору. В трубке раздались длинные гудки. Беккер решил, что трубку поднимут на пятый гудок, однако ее подняли на девятнадцатый. - Городская больница, - буркнула зачумленная секретарша.